356: The Identity Theory and Leibniz's Law

Leibniz'sprinciple of the indiscernibility of identical is often used as a means to demonstrate that mental states and brainstates can not be identical.

Some technical remarks in advance. Qualia is the plural of quale, which means the subjectivity of our sensory experiences.
A valid logical reasoning leads to a conclusion that is true, if and only if the premises are all true.
The symbol ≠ means IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH.

The remainder of this lecture are not my words but the words of Patricia Churchland, as quoted from her book "Neurophilosophy", 1986.

This lecture will be longer than usual, but you really have to hear this and maybe reread it later, because it is a brilliant example of logical and philosophical analysis regarding Leibniz Law and theIdentity Theory.

( A )
( 1 ) The qualia of my sensations are knowable to me by introspection .
( 2 ) The properties of my brain states are not knowable to me by introspection .
Therefore :
(3 ) The qualia of my sensations ≠ the properties of my brain states .

A second argument , complementary to the first , seems also in play :

(1) The properties of my brain states are knowable by the various external senses .
(2) The qualia of my sensations are not knowable by the various external senses .
Therefore :
(3) The qualia of my sensations ≠ the properties of my brain states .


The general form of the argument seems to be this :
(1) a is F
(2) b is not F
Therefore :
(3) a ≠ b

Leibniz 's law says that a = b if and only if a and b have every property in common . So if a = b, then if a is red, b is red, if a weighs ten pounds , then b weighs ten pounds , and so forth . If a is red and b is not , then a ~ b.

Assuming their premises are true , arguments (A ) and (B) appear to establish the nonidentity of brain states and mental states . But are their premises true ?

Let us begin with argument (A). There is no quarrel with the first premise (the qualia of my sensations are known -to-me-by-introspection ), especially since qualia are defined as those sensory qualities known by introspection ,

and in any case I have no wish to deny introspective awareness of sensations . In contrast , the second premise (the properties of my- brain states are NOT known-to-me-by-introspection ) looks decidedly troublesome.

Its first problem is that it begs the very question at issue - that is, the question of whether or not mental states are identical to brain states . This is easy to see when we ask what the justification is for thinking that premise true .

The point is this : if in fact mental states are identical to brain states, then when I introspect a mental state , I do introspect the brain state with which it is identical .

Needless to say, I may not describe my mental state as a brain state, but whether I do depends on what information I have about the brain , not upon whether the mental state really is identical to some brain state.

The identity can be a fact about the world independently of my knowledge that it is a fact about the world . Similarly , when Jones swallows an aspirin , he thereby swallows acetylsalicylic acid, whether or not he thinks of himself thus;

when Oedipus kissed Jocasta, he kissed his mother , whether or not he thought of himself thus . In short, identities may obtain even when we have not discovered that they do.

The problem with the second premise is that the only justification for denying that introspective awareness of sensations could be introspective awareness of brain states derives from the assumption that mental states are not identical with brain states.

And that is precisely what the argument is supposed to prove . Hence the charge of begging the question . (Although I have used (A) as an illustration , the same kind of criticism applies equally to (B).)

Other problems with these arguments are more subtle. One difficulty is best brought out by constructing an argument analogous to (A) or (B) with respect to the character of the properties under discussion and comparing the arguments for adequacy. Consider the following arguments :

(C)
(1) Smith believes Hitler to be a mass murderer .
(2) Smith does not believe Adolf Schicklgruber to be a mass murderer .
Therefore:
(3) Adolf Schicklgruber ≠ Adolf Hitler .

As it happens, however , Adolf Schicklgruber == Adolf Hitler , so the argument cannot be right . Or consider another instance of the general argument form where the property taking the place of F is a complex property concerning what John believes or knows :

(D )
(1) Aspirin is known by John to be a pain reliever.
(2) Acetylsalicylic acid is not known by John to be a pain reliever .
Therefore:
(3) Aspirin ≠ acetylsalicylic acid.

And one final example more closely analogous to the arguments at Issue:

(E)
(1) Temperature is directly apprehensible by me as a feature of material objects.
(2) Mean molecular kinetic energy is not directly apprehendable by me as a feature of material objects.
Therefore:
(3) Temperature ≠ mean molecular kinetic energy.

These arguments fail because being-recognized-as-a-something or being-believed-to-be-a-something is not a genuine feature of the object itself , but rather is a feature of the object as apprehended under some description or other or as thought about in some manner.

Having a certain mass is a property of the object, but being-thought-by-Smith-to-have-a-certain-mass is not a genuine property of the object. Such queer properties are sometimes called " intentional properties" to reflect their thought-mediated dependency .

Notice that in (B) the property is being-knowable-by-the-various -external-senses, and in (A) the property is being-known -by-me-by-introspection . Both are sterling examples of thought-dependent properties .

Now the arguments (C) through (E) are fallacious because they treat intentional properties as though they were genuine properties of the objects, and a mistake of this type is called the intentional fallacy.

It is evident that the arguments designed to demonstrate the nonidentity of qualia and brain states are analogous to arguments (C) through (E).

Consequently , they are equally fallacious, and the nonidentity of mental states and brain states cannot be considered established by arguments such as (A) and (B).


The Discussion

[13:29] herman Bergson: Whips his forehead.....
[13:29] herman Bergson: phew...
[13:29] herman Bergson: Thank you....
[13:29] Bejiita Imako: hehe
[13:30] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): whips her forehead too...
[13:31] herman Bergson: the main point of the lecture is that thought dependent properties like knowable to the senses are treated as properties of real objects , like weight and mass are such properties
[13:31] Mick Nerido: So we have mental states and brain states that cannot be proven identical?
[13:31] herman Bergson: And I found this extensive quote too beautiful and clear that I didn't want to rephrase it
[13:32] herman Bergson: No it is the other way around...
[13:32] herman Bergson: the fact that I know what it is like to feel my toothache , and I only can know it,
[13:33] Bejiita Imako: aaa like that if i think a thing work a certain way that doesn't mean that is the way it really works but how I THINK it works
[13:33] Bejiita Imako: I get everything right
[13:33] druth Vlodovic: I'm sure I could hook up some sort of detector that would tell me about your toothache
[13:33] herman Bergson: while all dentists in the world can see the hole in the tooth and the infected nerves, whci make then conclude:this is a toothache, means that these to things are not identical...
[13:34] druth Vlodovic: well, maybe not me personally
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: because the dentist cant feel your pain
[13:34] herman Bergson: Yes Druth, but the claim is that YOUR personal knowledge of the pain can only be YOUR personal knowledge....
[13:35] Bejiita Imako: only see and conclude that OUCH that gotta hurt!
[13:35] herman Bergson: so that is an EXTRA property which never can be detected by whatever tool or microscope
[13:35] Mick Nerido: My personal mental state is identical to my brain state...
[13:35] herman Bergson: Yes Mick....
[13:35] Bejiita Imako: you cant connect another persons senses to a osciloscope and measuring device that you can do with signals from ect a computer
[13:36] druth Vlodovic: can't we?
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: and get the exact meaning of that signal
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: the way I feel it
[13:36] herman Bergson: No Bejiita...we can not observe the subjective quality of an experience...
[13:36] druth Vlodovic: ah, the interpretation you mean
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: with a computer i can transmit data from one device to another for ex an mp3 in my computer can be transfered to my mp3 player and it will play exactly the same as my computer
[13:37] herman Bergson: but this subjective aspect is thought dependent, so added to the object by thought...not a physical property of the experience itself
[13:37] Mick Nerido: You bring all your personal history to every perception
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: that you can't do with the senses
[13:37] druth Vlodovic: sim suggested once that the mind could be thought of as the result of processes, solves a lot of problems
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: transfer another persons feelings to you so you can feel them as well
[13:38] Bejiita Imako: or what that person thinks
[13:38] Bejiita Imako: is impossible
[13:38] druth Vlodovic: you'd have to be able to duplicate all of the current processes in order to duplicate the specific eexperience
[13:38] herman Bergson: that is the problem Druth, for that isn't true...
[13:38] herman Bergson: I could duplicate you..but then there is a Druth 1 and a Druth 2
[13:38] druth Vlodovic: oh?
[13:39] Bejiita Imako: yes
[13:39] herman Bergson: so Druth 2 will only have Druth 2 experiences....
[13:39] Mick Nerido: Like our favorite songs have a different meaning to us than others...
[13:39] herman Bergson: Druth 1 will never experience what Druth 2 experiences
[13:39] Bejiita Imako: with a computer its possible as long the 2 cpus can process exactly the same data in exactly same way
[13:39] druth Vlodovic: but if both druths had the exact same processes going on then they would be having the same experiences
[13:39] Bejiita Imako: the 2 will read the information the same way
[13:40] druth Vlodovic: only the differences between them would prevent them having identical experiences
[13:40] Bejiita Imako: not possible with the mind between 2 persons
[13:40] herman Bergson: No Bejiita....there always is the difference caused by the individuality of Druth 1 and 2
[13:40] herman Bergson: Yes Druth….that is what the arguments (A) and (B) claim
[13:40] Bejiita Imako: and also no way to transfer from one mind to another, there is no "interface" that can do that isn the same way ex an usb port on your computer can
[13:40] druth Vlodovic: yes, if one cpu is slower or produces a different amount of heat then they are not identical
[13:41] herman Bergson: But that is only the case when you say that this personel feature of the experience , these qualia are properties of the mental states...
[13:42] Mick Nerido: When 2 people read the same newspaper the info therein is identical
[13:42] herman Bergson: But I claim that thought adds these properties to the mental state….
[13:43] Bejiita Imako: id say tat the biggest ting that it is impossible is because there is no way to transfer the exact mind information to another person in the way digital data is transferred from one computer to another, that's why mind reading is impossible
[13:43] herman Bergson: Well some of you collapsed already during the lecture.....
[13:43] herman Bergson: It was an experiment to put you all through this...
[13:44] herman Bergson: At least you have seen an example of professional philosophical analysis and the use of logic...
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: it was advanced complex but very interesting and i think i got a grasp of what it was all about
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:44] herman Bergson: I would suggest, if you want to get a better grip on it, read the blog ...
[13:45] Bejiita Imako: have to read on it some more indeed
[13:45] Bejiita Imako: lot of things
[13:46] Bejiita Imako: but as i see it i conclude it all means that because i think a thing is in a certain way that doesnt have to mean its the true state its simply what i believe it to be
[13:46] herman Bergson: The theme of the text is pretty clear....the arguments have fallen victim of a fallacy and thus dont prov ethat brain states and mental states can not be identical
[[13:46] herman Bergson: I have to watch my tongue!
[13:46] Bejiita Imako: haha
[13:46] bergfrau Apfelbaum: hmm? why we fall?
[13:46] Bejiita Imako: i still use the fall thing from Burn
[13:46] Bejiita Imako: its damn funny
[13:46] Qwark Allen: °͜° l ☺ ☻ ☺ l °͜°
[13:46] Qwark Allen: lol
[13:46] bergfrau Apfelbaum: omg
[13:46] Bejiita Imako: lol
[13:46] herman Bergson: I hope you enjoyed it yet...
[13:46] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): lol
[13:46] bergfrau Apfelbaum: was ist das?
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: the wort fall?perhaps
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: haha
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: jaaa
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: yes
[13:47] herman Bergson: Next time I'll be more gentle again to your minds
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: hehe
[13:47] Qwark Allen: fall
[13:47] druth Vlodovic: nah, we can take it
[13:47] Qwark Allen: was very good discussion
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: hahaha
[13:47] druth Vlodovic: we'll wear tinfoil hats to cool our overworked minds
[13:47] herman Bergson: So i See....lol
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: yey! herman
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: ty so much
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: ***** APPPPPPPLLLLAAAUUUSSSSEEEEEEE***********
[13:47] Qwark Allen: got to read the all thing again
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: HoOOOOOOoooooOOOOOooooOOOOooooOOOOoOOOOooooOOOOooOOOOooooOOOOooooOOOO..!!!! HAHAHAHAHAAHA
[13:47] bergfrau Apfelbaum: Yeah!!!!!
[13:47] Mick Nerido: Thanks herman!
[13:47] Bejiita Imako: awesome
[13:47] Qwark Allen: ¸¸.☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`☆ H E R MA N ☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`
[13:47] Qwark Allen: thank you
[13:48] herman Bergson: Thank you for your participation…..Class dismissed ㋡
[13:48] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:48] Bejiita Imako: oki cu soon
[13:48] bergfrau Apfelbaum: byebye class :-)) so u on tuesday
13:48] druth Vlodovic: have fun herman, and thanks fro the lecture
[13:48] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): thank you Herman...het was een pittige les!
[13:48] bergfrau Apfelbaum: danke hermaaaaaaan bussi :-)
[13:48] Qwark Allen: ˜*•. ˜”*°•.˜”*°• Bye ! •°*”˜.•°*”˜ .•*˜ ㋡
[13:48] Qwark Allen: i have to go to a partyy
[13:48] herman Bergson: Yes Beertje I was well aware of that
[13:49] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): needs a glas of wine now...
[13:49] bergfrau Apfelbaum: #°*** BABA ***°#
[13:49] herman Bergson: I guess so!

355: The Identity Theory, a first evaluation

The Identity theory is about the relation between brain states and mental states. Before we begin to address the question,"What are mental states?", it will be useful to have before us a list of the most significant features of mental states.

Such a list will help us assess theories of mental states by determining the extent to which a theory explains the existence of these features.

ln general, a theory of mental states which makes sense of these features is to be preferred to a theory which does not. Here's a possible list of general features of mental states.

1. Some mental states are caused by states of the world.
2. Some mental states cause actions.
3. Some mental states cause other mental states.

4. Some mental states are conscious.
5. Some mental states are about things in the world.
6. Some kinds of mental states are systematically correlated with certain kinds of brain states.

I guess you can fill in for yourself easily how these abstract descriptions apply to what goes on in our mind, whereas point 6 is the result of contemporary neuroscience.

How well does the Identity Theory explain these six features of mental states. Let's have a closer look.

"1. Some mental states are caused by states of the world."
I see a car (mental state) and there is a car approaching me.

If, as the identity theory claims, mental states are brain states, then the first feature amounts to the claim that some brain states are caused by states of the world.

Equally with respect to "2. Some mental states cause actions." we have discussed a overwhelming amount of neuro-scientific data and examples in previous lectures, which confirm that this is the case.

"3. Some mental states cause other mental states."
When I have the belief that it is Thursday today, and that on Thursday I always lecture, then I have good reason to believe that this is a lecture day today for me.

With "good reason" I mean, that the relations between my mental states are often characterized by rationality.

Here we run into a serious question: how can an account of the rationality of thought be squared with the claim that mental states are brain states?

"4. Some mental states are conscious." This is going to be the toughest nut to crack. How do consciousness and certain brain states relate to each other?

Like claim nr. 3 this feature of mental states will get considerable attention in next lectures.

"5. Some mental states are about things in the world."
Mental states represent the world as being in a certain way. My thoughts are always thoughts about something and often about things in the world.

That some brain state occurs in the visual cortex, when we look at a picture for instance, is common knowledge, but here it is about the content of a mental state. Is there a picture too? We'll pay attention to this issue in future lectures. Gonna be a difficult chapter.

"6. Some kinds of mental states are systematically correlated with certain kinds of brain states.
"
According to the identity theory, mental states literally are brain states.
Consequently, the identity theory smoothly explains the systematic correlation of mental states with brain states.

Whereas Dualism already crashed on explaining feature one and two of mental states, the identity appears to do a better job.

But yet we are still left with a number of questions. We still have a long way to go to get a full understanding of a theory of mind.

The Discussion

[13:20] herman Bergson: Thank you...
[13:21] herman Bergson: If you have any questions or remarks...feel free....
[13:22] Farv Hallison: I only recently realized that the mind is different from consciousness.
[[13:22] Farv Hallison: I used to think they are the same.
[13:22] Farv Hallison: I read Dennett's book thinking they are the same.
[13:22] herman Bergson: That is a matter of conceptual analysis Farv...
[13:23] herman Bergson: Just from scratch I would say...
[13:23] Qwark Allen: after this last lectures i think , mind, conscious and brain are the same thing
[13:23] herman Bergson: you have two stages of consciousness....
[13:23] herman Bergson: eventually yes Qwark...
[13:24] herman Bergson: But you can make a difference between awareness and consciousness....
[13:24] Qwark Allen: only brain states
[13:24] herman Bergson: when you drive your car you perform all kinds of actions of which you are not conscious of, but yet aware...shifting gear, breaking etc...
[13:25] herman Bergson: while you are conscious of the surrounding traffic....
[13:25] Qwark Allen: the brain as the focus thing
[13:25] Qwark Allen: we are focus in what we are doing
[13:25] herman Bergson: those two, awareness and consciousness, I would call the mind
[13:26] Qwark Allen: still a brain state
[13:26] Qwark Allen: i'm aware of priorities
[13:26] herman Bergson: and yes...just brain states
[13:26] Farv Hallison: I am thinking of those experiments where the subject is consciously aware only a half second after a descion has been made.
[13:26] herman Bergson: the Libett story, Farv....yes....
[13:27] herman Bergson: I still don' know what to think about it...
[13:27] herman Bergson: the conclusion is often that it proofs that th ebrain decides and we only have the illusion that we consciously decide, have free will in that
[13:28] herman Bergson: I am still working on that chapter
[13:28] Qwark Allen: i was thinking the same…. the brain can be manipulated
[13:28] Farv Hallison: I interpret it to mean that consciousness is different than the brain.
[13:29] herman Bergson: yes Qwark....for instance...memories can be provoked by electro-stimulation of certain brain areas
[13:29] Qwark Allen: herman will go to free will again soon ^^
[13:29] Qwark Allen: some past lectures were about free will , and how we can manipulate brain states to a purpose
[13:29] herman Bergson: that is a kind of dualistic interpretation , I would say Farv
[[13:30] Qwark Allen: yet, was a brain state tha
[13:31] Farv Hallison: I call it triality because I think the mind makes the decisions and it is different than the brain.
[13:31] Qwark Allen: eheheh
[13:31] Qwark Allen: funny
[13:31] herman Bergson: Well look at the situation more closely....
[13:32] herman Bergson: there is the "I" that decides to raise my hand....
[13:32] herman Bergson: I even don't know what that I is but I can say here I am...
[13:33] herman Bergson: then in the brain the motoric parts are faster in action than the other part that makes me say "I raised my hand"
[13:33] herman Bergson: the famous half second...
[13:33] herman Bergson: So what is observed is brain activity in two different areas only with a temporal difference
[13:34] herman Bergson: and fro that they conclude that the brain is faster than the conscious experience of raising my arm....
[13:34] Qwark Allen: the same temporal difference explains the " deja vu"
[13:34] herman Bergson: to me it is bogus
[13:34] herman Bergson: the brain is a unity..thus is the mind....
[13:35] herman Bergson: For instance....
[13:35] herman Bergson: there is no single spot in the brain that can be pointed out as THE central processor, so to speak
[13:36] herman Bergson: Francis Crick suggested that the unity of the brain was created by brain areas working together at the same 40Mhz or somethin glike that
[13:37] herman Bergson: So free will is gonna be a nice subject
[13:37] Qwark Allen: :-)
[13:37] herman Bergson: and the unity of the person too :-)
[13:37] Farv Hallison: more like 40 Hertz
[13:37] herman Bergson: You certainly will be right Farv....your area :-)
[13:38] Qwark Allen: i was thinking more in gigaherz
[13:38] herman Bergson: With Mhz our brain would be cooke din no time
[13:38] Qwark Allen: the calculations in brain are more then 40 hertz/second
[13:39] herman Bergson: I am no neuro scientist...I just pick up the idea...
[13:39] Qwark Allen: for a computer reach the brain speed, they got to evoulte processors more 20 years
[13:39] Qwark Allen: CPUs now are around 16 gigahertz
[13:39] Farv Hallison: Hertz is oscilations per second
[13:39] Qwark Allen: or calculations
[13:40] herman Bergson: the main point...philosophically and from a brian state point of view is
[13:40] herman Bergson: that there is nothing in the brain that shows this oneness which we as a person experience....
[13:41] herman Bergson: So ..there is no "I" in the brain....but it is in the mind!
[13:41] herman Bergson: when mental states and brain stated are identical...we may have a problem here with the "I"
[13:42] herman Bergson: We could suggest that the "I" is constituted by consciousness
[13:42] herman Bergson: produced by consciousness....
[13:43] herman Bergson: I really have to think about this....

[13:43] herman Bergson: or the "I" is identical to consciousness which is identical to a brianstate....
[13:44] herman Bergson: Well, I guess I drop this puzzle into your laps ^_^
[13:44] herman Bergson: and thank you for your participation...
[13:44] Farv Hallison: ^_^
[13:44] Lizzy Pleides: if you figure it out you'll get the nobel prize probably, Herman:)
13:44] herman Bergson: You might be right about that, Lizzy
[13:44] Bibbe Oh: or lynched
[13:44] herman Bergson: smiles
[13:45] Frederica Lexenstar: there is no nobel prize in philosophy
[13:45] herman Bergson: Well a prize or a funeral…I am working on it...
[13:45] Frederica Lexenstar: :-P
[13:45] Bibbe Oh: they reward Philosophers oddly in our world
[13:45] Bibbe Oh: or have in history
[13:45] Frederica Lexenstar: hemlock
[13:45] herman Bergson: What you say Bibbe…..!!!!
[13:45] herman Bergson: That is true....
[13:46] herman Bergson: isn't that amazing actually !!!!
[13:46] Bibbe Oh: yes!
[13:46] herman Bergson: It tells something about the way this Nobel looked at this world
[13:46] Qwark Allen: i have to go
[13:47] Qwark Allen: see you tuesday
[13:47] Lizzy Pleides: TC Qwark
[13:47] Qwark Allen: ty hermaan, exellent lecture
[13:47] Qwark Allen: .-)
[13:47] herman Bergson: Ok Qwark...
[13:47] herman Bergson: Class dismissed ...^_^
[13:47] Frederica Lexenstar: thank you!'
[13:47] Lizzy Pleides: Thank you Herman
[13:47] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): thank you Herman:)
[13:47] Farv Hallison: Thank you Professor Bergson
[13:48] Bibbe Oh: thank you, Professor
[13:48] herman Bergson: Nice class again....thank you
[13:49] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): have a nice evening all:)
[13:49] Lizzy Pleides: Good night Herman, good night everybody!
[13:49] herman Bergson: Night Lizzy

354: The Brain and the Identity Theory 3

"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain.

Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we would hardly say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’.

Here I take identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes and perhaps states of the mind and brain.

Consider an experience of pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes.

Some philosophers hold that though experiences are brain processes they nevertheless have fundamentally non-physical, psychical, properties, sometimes called ‘qualia’.
Here I shall take the identity theory as denying the existence of such irreducible non-physical properties.

Some identity theorists give a behaviouristic analysis of mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but others, sometimes called ‘central state materialists’, say that mental states are actual brain states.

Identity theorists often describe themselves as ‘materialists’ but ‘physicalists’ may be a better word. That is, one might be a materialist about mind but nevertheless hold that there are entities referred to in physics that are not happily described as ‘material’.

In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a species of physicalism, I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism.

It would be absurd to try to translate sentences containing the word ‘brain’ or the word ‘sensation’ into sentences about electrons, protons and so on."

These are not my words, but the words of J.J.C. Smart (1920 - …) himself in his essay on the identity theory in the http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

First published Wed Jan 12, 2000; substantive revision Fri May 18, 2007. J.J.C. Smart was 87 when he did a revision of his essay! And he is still among us, as far as my information goes.

It is interesting to read the words from the man himself, the philosopher, who put materialism again on the map. He suggests however, that physicalism is a better word than materialism. Why?

The Stanford Encyclopedia says: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical.

The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental.

The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical.

Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature.

But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical."

And when you go to the page M for the entry of materialism, I guess, you will smile, for it only says:
materialism --- see physicalism.

My guess is, that this use of names has a historical background, it is a matter of modern emphasis and maybe to masks the bad sound of the word materialism, so close to materialist (old word for banker :-) or atheist.

The ontological question is not focused on matter, what the stuff is, but on the thesis that what really exists is only governed by the laws of physics as we know them today. That is our ontology here.

By the way, bookmark this page, exciting material:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/site/map/


The Discussion

[13:29] Qwark Allen: ¸¸.☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`☆ H E R MA N ☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`
[13:29] Qwark Allen: thank you
[13:29] Ciska Riverstone: thank you herman
[13:29] herman Bergson: Take your time to digest it all ㋡
[13:29] Qwark Allen: bit by bit you take us all to the basic of matter
[13:29] Lizzy Pleides: thank you Herman
[[13:29] herman Bergson: But the floor is yours if you have any question or remark
[13:29] Ciska Riverstone: sorry have to leave - great lecture ㋡
13:30] Qwark Allen: i think the way that materialism evolute, makes it more logical
[13:31] herman Bergson: makes what more logical Qwark?
[13:31] Qwark Allen: materialism
[13:31] Qwark Allen: physicalism sounds like a evolution of materialism
[13:31] Mick Nerido: Everything is physical in the world...science maintains also.
[13:32] herman Bergson: Yes...but I understand the shift to the term physicalism.....
[13:32] Qwark Allen: more adapted to the "new reality"
[13:32] herman Bergson: yes...
[13:32] herman Bergson: Materialism is focused on the question...What is matter....
[13:32] druth Vlodovic: attempts to dislodge baggage, when done too early it just loads the baggage onto the new term
[13:32] herman Bergson: But I think that isn't interesting anymore...
[13:33] Qwark Allen: what is the question?
[13:33] herman Bergson: no..I wouldn't say that Druth...
[13:33] Mick Nerido: There are not spirits or souls floating around...
[13:33] herman Bergson: It is more a matter of shifting focus...
[13:34] herman Bergson: whatever matter may be....the focus is on the laws of physics..
[13:34] druth Vlodovic: oh I see, I was mistaking the root word
[13:34] herman Bergson: We know what matter is...well...atoms, protons neutron...and now we try to find higgs particles and so on
[13:35] herman Bergson: but ontologically that is not the most important thing I would say
[13:35] herman Bergson: what is more important is...that whatever there is..it follows the laws of nature we have discovered
[13:35] Mick Nerido: The deeper we dig into matter the more particals we find
[13:35] herman Bergson: Yes Mick…seems so....
[13:36] Lizzy Pleides: we are doing a balance act between several sciences i think
[13:36] herman Bergson: but in fact philosophically it is not that important...
[13:36] druth Vlodovic: depends if you are looking for the laws or the effects of the laws
[13:36] herman Bergson: important is that whatever is, is under the laws of nature as we know them
[13:37] druth Vlodovic: or the laws of nature, whether we know them yet or not
[13:37] herman Bergson: we definitely don't know everything....
[13:37] Mick Nerido: Physicalism maintains that whatever we discover will obey scientific laws, not randomness?
[13:38] herman Bergson: there was that little upheaval about particles that seemed to move faster than lightspeed....
[13:38] Lizzy Pleides: and surely there are many laws of nature we don't know
[13:38] herman Bergson: Yes Mick.....but there is a big BUT
[13:39] herman Bergson: whatever we call matter....at the bottom we find quantum mechanics....
[13:39] Mick Nerido: BUT?
[13:39] herman Bergson: where randomness is the rule , it seems
[13:39] Mick Nerido: ahh..
[13:39] herman Bergson: this goes deep...
[13:39] druth Vlodovic: "physicalism" sounds like "dependant on physical phenomenon" "physicsalism" might be better, except it sounds awful
[13:39] herman Bergson: Because many said that materialism is synonimous with determinism...
[13:40] Mick Nerido: over my head :)
[13:40] herman Bergson: smiles at Druth...
[13:40] herman Bergson: there are a lot of ugly words in philosophy....^_^
[13:41] Qwark Allen: what is wrong with determinism?
[13:41] druth Vlodovic: I'm sure at some point they will find formulas to make quantum mechanics deterministic
[13:41] herman Bergson: I don't know druth
[13:41] herman Bergson: There is nothing wrong with determinism, Qwark...
[13:42] Qwark Allen: in physicalism seems the laws of physical world are the "law"
[13:42] herman Bergson: the problem is only that when everything is determined by a chain of causality, we really get nervous about the concept of free will!
[13:42] Qwark Allen: if so, determinism should be a standard
[13:42] Qwark Allen: there is no free will
[13:42] Qwark Allen: we know that at a long time
[13:43] Lizzy Pleides: i am not convinced of that
[13:43] herman Bergson: Well....you will be served Qwark....the chapter on the free will is already in preparation :-)
[13:43] Qwark Allen: i think after today, this idea should be more studied
[13:43] herman Bergson: We'll discuss that issue at length here, Qwark
[13:43] Qwark Allen: very nice
[13:44] herman Bergson: Dont worry...
[13:44] Qwark Allen: sounds logical
[13:44] herman Bergson: And look who is in time...Rodney!!!!
[13:44] Qwark Allen: HooooooooOOOOOOOOOOOooooooooooo !!!!!!
[13:44] Rodney Handrick: Hi Herman
[13:44] herman Bergson: Welcome Rodney
[13:44] herman Bergson: smiles
[13:44] Lizzy Pleides: lol
[13:44] druth Vlodovic: I'm worried, I've been to a few "free will" "debates"
[13:44] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): lol
[13:44] druth Vlodovic: can we bring clubs?
[13:44] Qwark Allen: class dismissed
[13:44] Qwark Allen: hehehe
[[13:45] druth Vlodovic: lots of emotionalism
[13:45] herman Bergson: The show begins...lol
[13:45] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): i'm going back to the show..thank you for the lecture Herman
[13:45] herman Bergson: Ohh....is that so
[13:45] Qwark Allen: very nice outfit Beertje
[13:45] herman Bergson: See you soon Beertje ^_^
[13:45] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): ㋡
[13:46] Lizzy Pleides: TC beertje
[13:46] Qwark Allen: a pity i have to go dj-ing
[13:46] herman Bergson: isn't she gorgeous ^_^
[13:46] Qwark Allen: ::::::::: * E * X * C * E * L * L * E * N * T * ::::::::::
[13:46] druth Vlodovic: where is the show?
[13:46] herman Bergson: Well..I guess now we all get distracted
[13:46] herman Bergson: I can give you a LM Druth
[13:47] druth Vlodovic: please
13:47] herman Bergson: Well....for good order...
[13:47] herman Bergson: Class dismissed...
[13:47] Qwark Allen: ehhehehe
[13:47] Qwark Allen: ¸¸.☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`☆ H E R MA N ☆´ ¯¨☆.¸¸`☆** **☆´ ¸¸.☆¨¯`
[13:47] Qwark Allen: thank you
[13:47] druth Vlodovic: every philosophical debate should end with a cabaret
[13:47] herman Bergson: Thank you all for you participation....
[13:47] Qwark Allen: was for sure very interesting
[13:47] herman Bergson: YEAH!
[13:48] Mick Nerido: Thanks!
[13:48] Qwark Allen: all these lectures are leading for a good conclusion
[13:48] Qwark Allen: there is no spoon!
[13:48] herman Bergson: Working on it Qwark...:)

353: The Brain and the Identity Theory 2

As I said in the previous lecture, it was around the end of the 1950s, that materialism was taken seriously. And even then it was still laughed at.

What was worse, materialism was sometimes regarded as synonymous with atheism and in the opinion of many people being an atheist is not a good thing.

To explain science and it meaning by a metaphysics in which there is no room for non physical objects or properties leaves no room for gods and the like. And the Identity Theory tells us that the mind is just a physical thing.

The identity theory gets its name because it identifies, claims an identity, between mental states and certain brain states. I say "certain" brain states,

because whilst the identity theory claims that every mental state is a brain state, it is not committed to the opposite. In fact, it's certainly not the case that every brain state is a mental state.

When J.J.C. Smart (1920 - …) articulated the identity theory he used a couple of analogies to convey his claim that mental states are brain states.

According to him, mental states are brain states in the same way that water is H2O and lightning is an atmospheric electrical discharge.

These analogies point at one specific feature. It took considerable scientific investigation to discover that water is identical to H2O and that lightning is an electric discharge and not a weapon of a god.

Similarly, the claim that mental states are brain states isn't supposed to be an obvious truth which can be established by simple observation or by reflecting on the meanings of expressions like 'belief' and 'cortex'.

Rather,the claim that mental states are brain states is plausible in part because of advances in our understanding of the human brain.

There is an other aspect with regard to identity. To make this clear we need the important type - token distinction.

In my garden I see blackbirds, sparrows and finches. They are all of the same type, that is "bird". The individual birds I call tokens of the type bird.

Now we take this one step further to understand the concept of identity, when we talk about token identity and type identity.

The current president of the US and Obama both can invite me for a party. In this case they are token identical as instantiations of the type "president" for instance.

In contrast,the identities between water and H2O,and between lightning and atmospheric electrical discharge, are type identities.

Every token of the type water is a token of the type H2O, and every token of the type Iightning is a token of the type atmospheric electrical discharge.

Science has discovered that the type water and the type H2O are identical, as are the types Iightning and atmospheric electrical discharge.

Now we may clarify the kind of identity which is meant by the Identity Theory. According to this theory there is a type identity between mental states and brain states.

For example, every token of the type pain is a token of the type c-fiber firing. The c-fiber is especial nerve which when firing gives us the experience of pain.

So, the identity theory asserts that every type of mental state is identical to a type of brain state. The brain states in question are physical states of the brain.

These identities are not supposed to be discoverable by simple observation or by examining the meanings of the terms involved. Rather, they are analogous to scientific identities like " water is H2O".

This may sound all very plausible. But as you may expect, this is a philosophical theory, thence there certainly will be people who disagree with is.

That will be the subject of our next lecture. ㋡


The Discussion

[13:19] herman Bergson: Thank you...
[13:19] Qwark Allen: ::::::::: * E * X * C * E * L * L * E * N * T * ::::::::::
[13:20] Mick Nerido: So for every mind state the is a specific brain state
[13:20] herman Bergson: The floor is yours now ... ㋡
[13:20] Qwark Allen: yes indeed
[13:20] Qwark Allen: mick
[13:20] Lizzy Pleides: great
[13:20] herman Bergson: Yes Mick...that is the idea
[13:21] Gir (florencio.flores): herman but every brain is different and we are all the same thing
[13:21] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): tries every type of mental state etc
[13:21] Gir (florencio.flores): you know the human thing
[13:21] Qwark Allen: you experience pleasure when , endorfines are released in the brain
[13:21] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): hmmm
[13:21] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): so by changing our mind we can change our brain?
[13:21] Qwark Allen: more the oppposite
[13:21] Qwark Allen: change the brain, and you change the mind
[13:22] herman Bergson: You are changing one and the same thing Beertje
[13:22] Gir (florencio.flores): herman but every brain is different and we are all the same thing
[13:22] herman Bergson: And yes Gir every brain is different.....
[13:22] Gir (florencio.flores): you know the human thing
[13:22] Gir (florencio.flores): yes yes
[13:22] herman Bergson: but we are talking about type identity....
[13:22] Lizzy Pleides: we have all different synapses
[13:23] Gir (florencio.flores): if you think in the future its just all about ID'S
[13:23] herman Bergson: so we both experience pain in our finger...btu that doesnt need to mean that your mental state is exactly identical with mine...
[13:23] Mick Nerido: The point is there is a physical manifesation in the brain for all mental states
[13:23] herman Bergson: the specific experience of for instance pain is a token of the type pain....or call it an instantiation
[13:24] herman Bergson: Yes Mick...and fMRI scanners show more and more that this is the case
[13:24] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): Yes-ah!
[13:24] herman Bergson: the idea is this....
[13:25] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): then that would mean that prisoners have a brain change over the year, after the pain or imprisonment?
[13:25] herman Bergson: science could talk about water......or about H2O....
[13:25] herman Bergson: And science uses H2O ....so reduces water to H2O
[13:26] herman Bergson: something similar you could see with mental states...
[13:26] Gir (florencio.flores): but in Science herman the science got the state of plasma it is similar like the water
[13:26] herman Bergson: we talk about joy and pain....science talks about certain brain activity...
[13:27] Mick Nerido: If I am imagining Niagra Falls would every ones brain look the same doing this?
[13:27] Qwark Allen: heeheh
[13:27] herman Bergson: oops?
[13:27] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): ohoh
[13:27] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): lol
[13:27] herman Bergson: Qwark fainted?
[13:27] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): word trigger
[13:27] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): ♥ LOL ♥
[13:27] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): fall
[13:27] Qwark Allen: was to much for me
[13:27] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): oops
[13:27] Qwark Allen: °͜° l ☺ ☻ ☺ l °͜°
[13:27] Qwark Allen: lol
[13:27] herman Bergson: lol
[13:27] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): if the brain activity is induced by an external factor, than would we talk about, external activity? rather than brain activity, maybe reactivity?
[13:28] herman Bergson: No Alaya....
[13:28] Gir (florencio.flores): profesor?
[13:28] herman Bergson: and no Mick.....
[13:28] herman Bergson: the instantiation of your mental image of the Niagara f*lls
[13:28] herman Bergson: can be different from the one in my mind
[13:29] herman Bergson: Gir?
[13:29] Gir (florencio.flores): but in Science herman the science got the state of plasma it is similar like the water
[13:29] herman Bergson: what do you mean by that, Gir?
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum: it was very interesting! ty herman&class!!
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum:
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum: .,¡i|¹i¡¡i¹|i¡,. .,¡i|¹i¡¡i¹|i¡,.
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum: `'¹li¡|¡|¡il¹'` `'¹li¡|¡|¡il¹'`
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum:
[13:29] bergfrau Apfelbaum: see u!
[13:30] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): Bye, Bye ㋡
[13:30] herman Bergson: smiles at Bergie
[13:30] Lizzy Pleides: TC Bergfrau
[13:30] :: Beertje :: (beertje.beaumont): bye Bergfrau
[13:30] Gir (florencio.flores): yes herman that science could need for some things water
[13:30] Gir (florencio.flores): but it has it own plasma state
[13:30] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): type plasma?
[13:31] Gir (florencio.flores): yes alaya
[13:31] Florencio spanked Qwark's ass ...
[13:31] herman Bergson: The issue here is that the concept of water is so to speak translated into another language...the language of chemistry
[13:31] Mick Nerido: and not just fire earth air and water...
[13:32] herman Bergson: and we have chooses for that language eventually because we can explain more using that language than using terms like 'water' or 'air'
13:32] Lizzy Pleides: if you say H2O to a child it won't understand
[13:32] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): lol
[13:32] herman Bergson: no....neither would a single person from the Middle Ages
[13:32] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): do you want a glass of type h2o
[13:33] Qwark Allen: or from certain parts of Africa or Australia
[13:33] herman Bergson: smiles
[13:33] herman Bergson: yes plz ㋡
[13:34] herman Bergson: As I said.....the discovery of the identity of water and H2O is the result of scientific research....not just an obvious conclusion from observation
[13:34] Gir (florencio.flores): allright
[13:34] herman Bergson: You amy joke about a glass of H2O, but it tells us yet something...
[13:35] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:35] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): :-)
[13:35] herman Bergson: Maybe one day we will revise our language and for example drop the term water and start talking about H2O only...
[13:36] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:36] Mick Nerido: H2O, h2o everywhere and not a drop to drink?
[13:36] herman Bergson: Like we have dropped a lot of words as real descriptions of reality...for example, spell, curse etc...
[13:36] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:36] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): ♥ LOL ♥
[13:36] Gir (florencio.flores): you mean that starting to live the era of scientific reality herman?
[13:36] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:36] herman Bergson: We use them now knowing that these words do not describe reality
[13:36] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:37] herman Bergson: We already live in that aera, Gir
[13:37] cup of water FoolYa Illusions_worn on r hand whispers: Ahhh Water
[13:37] herman Bergson: lol....
[13:37] Lizzy Pleides: but we have different kinds of water
[13:37] Gir (florencio.flores): ok
[13:37] herman Bergson: water !!!
[13:37] Gir (florencio.flores): brb
[13:37] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): Yes-ah!
[13:37] Coagulate Script Counter: Your script count went up by 1 to 91 scripts.
[13:37] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): ohoh
[13:38] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): oh dear this class is deteriorating
[13:38] herman Bergson: smiles...
[13:38] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): maybe another analogy would be better at the next class
[13:38] herman Bergson: Time to thank you all for your participation
[13:38] Qwark Allen: fall
[13:38] herman Bergson: Class dismissed... ㋡
[13:38] Qwark Allen: °͜° l ☺ ☻ ☺ l °͜°
[13:38] Qwark Allen: lol
[13:38] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): thnx
[13:39] herman Bergson: oh dear...
[13:39] herman Bergson whispers: what did you put in the water Alaya!!!
[13:39] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): Bye, Bye ㋡
[13:39] Gemma Allen (gemma.cleanslate): lol

352: The Brain and the Identity Theory 1

Very roughly, the identity theory asserts that the mind is the brain.More precisely, it claims that mental states are physical states of the brain.The qualification 'physical' is important.

After all,property dualism asserts that mental states are properties of the brain. However,according to property dualism, mental states are nonphysical properties of the brain.

Conseqently,if the identity theory is to be distinct from property dualism,it must assert that mental states are physical states of the brain.

Maybe you have an intuitive notion of agreeing with this idea: the mind is the brain. At least you have been softened up to get used to this idea by the media.

The brain is hot these days. To give you some examples. I got an offer of a trial subscription to a news weekly.

When I would accept I also would receive a 100 pages full color magazine titled "The brain", subtitle: "Everything you need to know about the brain, how it operate and how to keep it sharp."

I read two newspapers and both newspapers found it news to report on a publication in the professional magazine "Nature Neuroscience".

It is about the fact that we actually are born optimists. From psychology we already know for decades that we are.

Most people think, that misery, diseases and accidents always happen to others, never to themselves.

The newspaper article reveals, that this optimism isn't just a mental state, no…it is hard wired in the brain.

With fMRI scans neuroscientists have discovered that only when positive messages are received the prefrontal cortex really comes into action.

Test persons were asked to estimate their chances on all kinds of misery, from accidents to Alzheimer. Then they were confronted with the real statistics.

Asked a second time to estimate their chances, those who had mentioned higher chances than statistics predicted, adjusted their guess properly.

However those who had estimated their chances on misery lower than statistics predicted, stuck to their lower estimations with only a little adjustment.

The brain scans showed that when test persons had to adjust their estimation downward, their prefrontal cortex showed lots of activity.

But when they had to adjust their estimation upward to get in line with the statistics, most of the test persons just ignored that information and showed little activity in the prefrontal cortex.

You can imagine that when you get such information from the media continuously, unconsciously you are softened up to accept the idea that the brain is the mind.

The idea that mental states are brain states is not new.The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (l588-1679) and his French contemporary Pierre Gassendi (l592-1655) both made the claim more than three hundred years ago.

However, the idea wasn't carefully expressed and defended until the 1950s when a group of Australian philosophers including J.J.C.Smart explored the idea.

I searched my bookshelves and found it, bought in September 1976: "A Materialist Theory of the Mind" by D.M. Armstrong (1968).

I really get nostalgic, when after I guess a 30 years or so I read the first lines of the 'Acknowledgements": "Professor J.J. Smart converted me to the view, defended in this book, that mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain" (University of Sydney).

Next lecture we'll have a detailed look at the Identity Theory. In the meantime, you just keep an eye on how often you read or see in the media messages, that support the idea that the mind is the brain.


The Discussion

[13:21] herman Bergson: Thank you....
[13:21] Qwark Allen: ::::::::: * E * X * C * E * L * L * E * N * T * ::::::::::
[13:21] Qwark Allen: :-)
[13:21] herman Bergson: Feel free to drop some remarks or questions ㋡
[13:22] herman Bergson: the floor is yours
[13:22] Qwark Allen: in a way it`s how media explore us, to get the message they want to us
[13:22] Ciska Riverstone: thank you herman - rl needs me - have a good time everyone
[13:22] Bibbe Oh: ciao
[13:22] Bejiita Imako: Ciska
[13:22] Bejiita Imako: cu
[13:22] Qwark Allen: manipulation of the message
[13:22] herman Bergson: Yes Qwark...the media play an important role in shaping our thinking
[13:23] Mick Nerido: Why do you thing we are hard wired optimists?
[13:23] herman Bergson: Just go to the bookstore and look how many books there are on the brian and the mind
[13:23] Bibbe Oh: and in triggering primal response systems to manipulate our behavior
[13:23] herman Bergson: Well Mick....I think because evolutionary this has an advantage
[13:24] Qwark Allen: bad brains don`t procreate ehehhe
[13:24] Bejiita Imako: heheh
[13:24] herman Bergson: When the brain closes itself for negative information....we stay explorers and curious after new things
[13:24] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): the neurosicences research are feeding these ideologies, but in other country they say that the mind isn't the brain but a physical extention... since we cant see its invisible part, where is the mind….core….if the brian is the feet sort of
[13:24] Bibbe Oh: some of these attached to autonomic functioning, hormone release, fight or flight, and these give rise to "feelings" which many identify as being the true self
[13:24] Mick Nerido: The glass is half full..
[13:25] Bibbe Oh: though they are products of the body regulatory systems
[13:26] herman Bergson: yes Bibbe ...it is what they call the reptilian brain or limbic system in our head
[13:26] Bibbe Oh: yes
[13:26] Bibbe Oh: lizard and dog brains
[13:26] Rodney Handrick is Online
[13:27] herman Bergson: And yes Alaya....we should keep a sharp eye on the question what is science and what is ideology...
[13:27] herman Bergson: As I said...the continuing information in the media.....
[13:28] herman Bergson: on the one hand science...on the other hand…well…a specific view of reality
[13:28] Mick Nerido: There is so much more information faster than ever now...
[13:28] herman Bergson: Yes Mick..it is all under our fingertips now
[13:29] herman Bergson: And in our case....
[13:29] herman Bergson: the materialist theory of mind conflicts with a lot of metaphysical beliefs
[13:30] herman Bergson: But I notice that you don't worry too much about that..at least not yet :-)
[13:31] herman Bergson: Well... I guess that all was quite clear then today
[13:32] herman Bergson: unless some one still has a question or remark?
[13:32] herman Bergson: Ok... let's have an easy day :-)
[13:33] Mick Nerido: Thanks good session
[13:33] Bejiita Imako: yes
[13:33] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:33] herman Bergson: Thank you all for your participation
[13:33] Lizzy Pleides: thank you Herman
[13:33] herman Bergson: Class dismissed ㋡
[13:33] Bibbe Oh: thank you!
[13:33] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): i didn't hear much metaphysic data recently
[13:34] herman Bergson: Thursday will be more difficult , so be prepared ^_^
[13:34] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): i ll keep an open eye
[13:34] Lizzy Pleides: good byee everybody
[13:34] Qwark Allen: yes indeed
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: cu all
[13:34] Qwark Allen: very interesting
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: 9
[13:34] herman Bergson: No Alaya, today it was rather quiet on the metaphysical front
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:35] Qwark Allen: there wasn't much to go in that direction
[13:35] herman Bergson: no...
[13:35] Qwark Allen: agains't facts, not much arguments
[13:35] Qwark Allen: eheheh
[13:35] Bibbe Oh: pretty straightforward
[13:35] herman Bergson: true....
[13:35] Bejiita Imako: yes
[13:35] Qwark Allen: at least in what concerns the physiology of the brain
[13:36] Qwark Allen: ㋡ ˜*•. ˜”*°•.˜”*°• Helloooooo! •°*”˜.•°*”˜ .•*˜ ㋡
[13:36] Qwark Allen: Hey! rodney
[13:36] Qwark Allen: just in time
[13:36] Qwark Allen: eheheh
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: 9
[13:36] Rodney Handrick: Hi Qwark
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: hi Rodney
[13:36] herman Bergson: I thought it was interesting to show you how often you are exposed these days to a specific theory of the mind in the media
[13:36] Rodney Handrick: hi Bejiita
[13:36] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): are yuo the one who always come at the exact last minut rodney?
[13:36] Qwark Allen: indeed
[13:36] Qwark Allen: ehehehhe
[13:36] Qwark Allen: °͜° l ☺ ☻ ☺ l °͜°
[13:36] Qwark Allen: lol
[13:36] herman Bergson: Hi Rodney...
[13:37] Rodney Handrick: Not sure Alaya...lol
[13:37] Rodney Handrick: Hi Herman
[13:37] herman Bergson: Yes Alaya…Rodney comes always too late ^_^
[13:37] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): aw, then it wasn't you, there was one….that i forgot the name
[13:37] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): was it, lol
[13:37] Rodney Handrick: HA HA HA HA HA
[13:37] herman Bergson: Yes That is our Rodney...
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: hehehe
[13:37] Rodney Handrick: HA HA HA HA HA
[13:37] Qwark Allen: so funny that smile rodney
[13:37] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): ♦♫♦.。・*゜*・。.♦♫♦♪♥❢APPLAUSE❢❤♪♦♫♦♫.。・*゜*・。.♦♫♦
[13:38] Qwark Allen: allways makes me laught
[13:38] Qwark Allen: °͜° l ☺ ☻ ☺ l °͜°
[13:38] Qwark Allen: lol
[13:38] herman Bergson: no one better in timing than he! ㋡
[13:38] Rodney Handrick: :-)
[13:38] Bejiita Imako: haha
[13:38] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): well ill nick name my son rodney, than, he does the same
[13:38] herman Bergson: smiles
[13:39] herman Bergson: an honor to Rodney I guess !
[13:39] Alaya Chépaspourquoi (alaya.kumaki): ^^

351: The Behaviorist's Brain

What are mental states? When we ask that question we immediately discover that language by its structure forces us in certain directions.

In the previous lecture we discovered that the asymmetry between the statements " I feel a pain" and "He feels a pain" causes considerable philosophical problems.

In the l920s and l930s,a group of philosophers called the 'Vienna Circle' developed a new account of the meaning of a statement.

A statement is a sentence which claims that the world is a certain way. "The Eiffeltower is in Paris" and "The moon is made of cheese" are both statements.

The first makes a (true) claim about the location of a famous landmark; the second makes a (false) claim about the constitution of the moon.

The theory of the meaning of statements advocated by the Vienna Circle is called verificationism. On this view, the meaning of any statement is its method of verification.

Members of the Vienna Circle insisted that the only way to show that a statement is true is by making sensory observation.

That rules out all First Person Perspective statements, for they are not publicly accessible for verification. So how do we establish the meaning and thence the truth of mental statements.

Another argument, that changed the character of the mind - body debate came from Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951) with his private language argument.

If Dualism were right, then my believing, seeing, imagining, and loving would be essentially inner and private, inaccessible to anyone else.

But that very claim was expressed using words we all know: believing, seeing, imagining, loving.

Words are learned by correcting incorrect uses and praising correct uses. We must have learned these words in that manner.

But if Dualism were right, these things would be inner and private, inaccessible to anyone else. If so, we could never have learned these words. We did learn those words; therefore, Dualism must be wrong.

If our language of mental states is not about some private inner experience, what is it about? One proposal is that talk of mental states is really a way of talking about behavior.

And this proposal is in perfect harmony with the method of verification to establish the meaning and truth of mental statements: we only need publicly observable behavior.

Thus the debate on the mind - body problem moved from the question about the stuff the mental is made of to establishing the meaning of mental statements.

This gave rise to what was called Analytical or Philosophical Behaviorism: the view that mental concepts are definable in behavioral terms, or dispositions to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances.

In psychology this philosophy was translated into methodological behaviorism by B. F Skinner (1904–1990).,What went on inside a person was not a subject for science.

The organism in interaction with its environment receives stimuli and produces responses. Thus the goal of psychology became the study of the relation between stimuli and responses.

Thus the mental seemed to be perfectly translated into sensory observable facts. The mind grasped by science.

However, as you may well expect, philosophical behaviorism wasn't the answer, nor in psychology methodological behaviorism.

There are serious arguments against behaviorism and I guess, that the most serious one is, that it had no answer to the question "What is consciousness?"

So…we are still in business as philosophers.


The Discussion

[13:22] herman Bergson: Thank you....
[13:22] herman Bergson: The floor is yours
[13:22] herman Bergson: if you have questions or remarks
[13:23] You decline The Philosophy Class from A group member named herman Bergson.
[13:23] Paolo Rousselot: just notice the differences between exterior & interior observations & comments
[13:23] herman Bergson: what about it Paolo
[13:24] herman Bergson: Science is exterior only
[13:24] Paolo Rousselot: scattered throughout what you listed were obsevrations that reflected both positions
[13:24] Paolo Rousselot: again - wouldn't Jung disagree?
[13:24] herman Bergson: disagree with what?
[13:25] Paolo Rousselot: that all science is exterior only
[13:25] herman Bergson: oh yes...
[13:25] Paolo Rousselot: he seemed to have "verified" an interior journey that was replicable
[13:25] Mick Nerido: When one reads a book of fiction it can have a "real" world effect on us
[13:26] herman Bergson: unfortunately he doesn't meet the rigid verificationist standards
[13:26] Paolo Rousselot: and he might state that those who disagree haven't made tha same journey...
[13:26] Paolo Rousselot: either by choice or ability
[13:27] herman Bergson: that is not a sound argument....just the authority fallacy
[13:27] Paolo Rousselot: well, having "walked in the tall grass" I reserve the right to respectfully disagree
[13:27] Birric Forcella: Well, for behaviorists, there are no feelings or emotions. The behavior is all there is. So a behaviorist will take some gasoline, set a cat on fire (or a child) and observe the screaming and newling behavior. Does the cat (child) feel anything? Of course not. The behavior is all there is. that's basically what behaviorists do when they "cure" gays.
[13:27] Doodus Moose is Offline
[13:28] herman Bergson: cool example Birric...or hot actually
[13:28] Sybyle Perdide: thats too easy argued
[13:28] herman Bergson: Yes ..behaviorism isn't the answer to understand what the mind is or consciousness
[13:28] Sky Albanese: how many reported cat burnings have been atributed to behaviorists?
[13:29] herman Bergson: you have to ask the fire department that Sky,I dont know
[13:30] Birric Forcella: Lots of behaviorists in concentration camps - but also a lot of Jungians - the freudians were on the other side . . .
[13:30] Sky Albanese: i heard a lot of education is schools for kids with learning dificultys depends greatly on skinners work, that is a kid is given a small punishment for shoutings and fighting, and then a small reward for every good thing done, like sting and listing in class for 5 minutes
[13:30] Lizzy Pleides: they didn't know that they are behaviorists
[13:30] Sky Albanese: very practical tool they say
[13:30] Sybyle Perdide: I cannot fill completely the term behavior here in use
[13:30] herman Bergson: Well..at this moment scientifically it seems that th ereal name of Fraud is Fraud :-)
[13:31] herman Bergson: Freud
[13:31] herman Bergson: Behavior is any action of the organism Sybyle...
[13:31] Sybyle Perdide: oki
[13:31] Sybyle Perdide: thank you Herman
[13:32] Paolo Rousselot: is that solely an exterior action herman
[13:32] herman Bergson: As I said..behaviorism doesn't sell anymore :-)
[13:32] Sybyle Perdide: I think to try to take behavior as a indicator for mental reactions is worth trying
[13:32] Birric Forcella: Well, Freud asserted that human actions make sense when understood (interpreted) rightly - though you may fight over what is rightly there - Behaviorists assert that human actions are infinitely fungible - that any action can be tied to ANY stimulus. That means, human actions are basically meaningless. You decide who is right.
[13:32] herman Bergson: Yes Paolo
[13:33] Sky Albanese: people say it doesn't explain the mind, but then what does? nothing
[13:33] herman Bergson: The relation stimulus response is questionable...
[13:33] Birric Forcella: I myself am on the side of making sense . . .
[13:34] herman Bergson: there is no law like relation...
[13:34] Sybyle Perdide: the problem with Freud is, his doctrines were good, but not his conclusions
[13:34] herman Bergson: if so it would be possible to predict how a person would respond on a stimulus...
[13:34] Sybyle Perdide: nods
[13:34] Sky Albanese: he also though if experience as a replacement for experimentation
[13:34] Sky Albanese: thought
[13:34] Sybyle Perdide: but they had to try, that we can exclude
[13:35] herman Bergson: Suppose you go to a museum with a friend....
[13:35] Paolo Rousselot: a few years ago Big Dreams were quite a profound stimulus for me - it was my experience alone but very real nonetheless
[13:35] herman Bergson: That is exactly the point Paolo....
[13:35] Paolo Rousselot: k
[13:35] Sky Albanese: big dreams?
[13:35] herman Bergson: it was a private experience...
[13:36] Paolo Rousselot: yes Sky
[13:36] Birric Forcella: Behaviorism got superseded by cognitivism (which is an even more awful theory) because it was eventually recognized that learning occurs even without stimuli
[13:36] herman Bergson: exactly Birric
[13:36] herman Bergson: But well get to that in next lectures :-)
[13:36] Birric Forcella: okay
[13:37] herman Bergson: In fact the behavioristic approach tried to ignore the first person perspective of the mind....
[13:38] herman Bergson: discarding it as inaccessible for science
[13:38] herman Bergson: Yet it is there...the mind ..consciousness....a material universe...and we try to understand how this all goes together
[13:39] herman Bergson: soI guess I'll prepare some more lectures on this subject :-)
[13:39] Paolo Rousselot: (...and sometimes overlaps...)
[13:39] Birric Forcella: Vey nice
[13:39] herman Bergson: Thank you all for your participation...
[13:39] Birric Forcella: welcome
[13:39] herman Bergson: Class dismissed ㋡

350: The Brain from different perspectives

Let us assume, that we use language to describe the world around us. This sounds simple, but when we turn to the philosophy of mind, we immediately run into philosophical problems.

Just take these two simple statements: (1) "I feel pain" and (2) "He feels pain". There is a peculiar asymmetry: the difference between the First Person Perspective and the Third Person Perspective.

Empirically, the mind is determined by neuronal states, which are supposed to characterize the brain. There neuronal states are therefor a property of the brain.

Neuronal states of the brain are investigated empirically and related directly to different psychological and physiological functions.

In a general way you could define the mind as the total of all our mental states.

Mental states, however, can neither be investigated empirically nor related directly to neuronal states.

Unlike neuronal states,mental states are not accessible in Third-Person Perspective, which makes their direct empirical investigation impossible.

You can empirically investigate the truth of the statement "He is in pain", but that is impossible with "I am in pain". Only I have private access to my feeling of pain.

Since they are accessible in First-Person Perspective only, mental states can neither be related directly to psychological and physiological functions nor to neuronal states.

Due to the inability to directly relate mental states to neuronal states, mental states cannot be detected and recognized within the brain as being characterized by neuronal states.

Both problems, empirical accessibility of mental states with respect to the brain and the empirical relation between brain states and mental states remain, therefore unclear.

Both subjective experience and contents of mental states cannot be detected and recognized within the neuronal states and thus within the brain.

For example, subjective experience of certain events within the environment cannot be related directly to the neuronal states of the brain.

When I say "I see a blue shape" there may be activity in the visual cortex of the brain, but when you put me in a scanner you only see that. There will be no blue shape visible in my brain, although it really is in my mind.

Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective.

In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective.

You see the asymmetry between the First and Third person Perspective now? Third Person Perspective focuses on other brains, not on my own brain.

The funny thing is that the First Person Perspective gives me only access to my own mental states, but not to my own brain and its neuronal states.

We are facing a peculiar problem here. While my mind is filled with First Person statements like "i see an apple", "I feel happy", neuroscience can only approach the brain from a Third Person perspective.

How to solve this problem? A first attempt was to "translate" these First person statements into Third Person statements, because the Third Person Perspective is the perspective of the scientist.

Next lecture we'll focus on the first attempt the get to the mind from a Third Person Perspective and deal with this First Person Perspective. This attempt was called Behaviorism.


The Discussion

[13:21] herman Bergson: Thank you...
[13:21] herman Bergson: any questions or remarks? The floor is yours
[13:22] herman Bergson: You can address me in the Second Person ^_^
[13:22] Widget Whiteberry: Why is it a problem that neuroscience can only approach the brain from a Third Person perspective?
[13:23] herman Bergson: that is not the problem
[13:23] Clint Pheocene: because the third person perspective is not a complete picture
[13:23] Templeton Tigerpaw: If it does not register in neurons, it's not experienced. Period.
[13:23] herman Bergson: the problem is the First person experience of the mind...
[13:23] Bejiita Imako: thats really a thing i've thought about some times that you can never get access to the inner of another persons thoughts like if you would plug his external hard drive in your computer and get all files
[13:23] Bejiita Imako: that is impossible with the mind
[13:24] herman Bergson: yes Bejiita....
[13:24] Bejiita Imako: if that was possible thought reading would be possible and it ismt
[13:24] herman Bergson: The First person Perspective causes a lot of problems :-)
[13:24] Templeton Tigerpaw: It actually is possible
[13:24] Clerisse Beeswing: ahhh so third person sees all and feels all first
[13:24] herman Bergson: Yes Templeton....a Mind Melt like Spock does in StarTrek :-)
[13:25] Bejiita Imako: wll you can program a machine to react to a certain brain wave pattern but you cant translate it like analog to digital and vice versa and suddenly see the object we think of
[13:25] Templeton Tigerpaw: All you need is to find an objective way to tell if somebody is lying. Then you can believe any statement they make about their internal states. It's rather easy to tell is somebody is lying or hiding something.
[13:25] Templeton Tigerpaw: It's then merely a matter of skill in asking questions
[13:25] Sybyle Perdide: but thats only about lying..not about, if its pain is like yours
[13:26] herman Bergson: That is not entirely true Templeton...
[13:26] Templeton Tigerpaw: In principle there is no problem with access to other minds
[13:26] Bejiita Imako: aaa yes like that fMRI and blood flow
[13:26] herman Bergson: Even the fMRI scanner approach isn't waterproof...
[13:26] Bejiita Imako: i saw recently when myth busters tested just that thing
[13:26] Templeton Tigerpaw: This is why we can so easily communicate
[13:26] Bejiita Imako: and managed to fool it
[13:26] Clint Pheocene: yes there is a problem in principle because we do not yet have a theory about the nature of subjective experience
[13:27] herman Bergson: Exactly Clint!
[13:27] Templeton Tigerpaw: You ARE the theory of subjective experienc
[13:27] herman Bergson: That is my point today...
[13:27] Bejiita Imako: they also named that it worked with bloodflow readout
[13:27] Bejiita Imako: likse you said before
[13:27] herman Bergson: on theone hand the Third perosn approach of science
[13:27] herman Bergson: on the other hand that peculiar extra in First Person statements
[13:27] Templeton Tigerpaw: MRIs can easily detect if you are lying. In fact, new experiements show that MRIs can show crude pictures of what you see
[13:28] Templeton Tigerpaw: It's a matter of refining the technology
[13:28] Templeton Tigerpaw: The problem of qualia is different, but I think it's a red herring
[13:28] herman Bergson: That doesn't solve the problem Templeton....
[13:29] Sybyle Perdide: if you know I like a film (not lying), you don't know in which way
[13:29] herman Bergson: When the scanner shows some brain activity and the person says "I am not lying", who is telling the truth then?
[13:29] Bejiita Imako: w if a certain signal always stands for a certain vision then you can basically do like in a computer and transfetr fron digital to analog sort of but translate from the brain wave pattern instead from binary data
[13:29] Clint Pheocene: exactly sybyle
[13:29] Sybyle Perdide: you even don't know what I meanwith "like"
[13:29] Templeton Tigerpaw: Not lying about what?
[13:29] Sybyle Perdide: to like the film
[13:29] herman Bergson: Good observation Sybyle...indeed
[13:30] herman Bergson: Well templeton...
[13:30] herman Bergson: suppose somebody is in a scanner....
[13:30] Templeton Tigerpaw: Qualia seem so problematic because we always only hear about red and green. The simple fact is that EVERYTHING is a quale. You are merely tackling the most difficult thing first, like forever contemplating the peak of a mountain and never seeing the slope that gets there.
[13:30] herman Bergson: he tells something and the scanner says...that must be a lie
[13:30] herman Bergson: and the person says "I am telling the truth"
[13:31] Heinzi Gabe: a brain scan may reveal what i see and what i feel, but now how i experience the feeling or what i se
[13:31] Heinzi Gabe: see*
[13:31] herman Bergson: When you put the person under hypnosis he still says I am telling the truth
[13:31] herman Bergson: Yes Heinzi....
[13:31] Templeton Tigerpaw: Where is the problem? So he is lying.
[13:31] herman Bergson: The brain scan not even reveals WHAT you feel or see
[13:31] herman Bergson: only that you feel or see in a certain way
[13:31] Chantal (nymf.hathaway): Hi Serg ㋡
[13:32] Clint Pheocene: yes only weak correlations of blood flow
[13:32] Sergeiana Yatsenko: oops
[13:32] Sergeiana Yatsenko: hi
[13:32] Bejiita Imako: yes you cant get the actual "data" out cause impossible to translate in that way
[13:32] Bejiita Imako: like i said as from digital to analog
[13:32] Mick Nerido: The scan shows an area of activity not truth or lies
[13:32] herman Bergson: YEs Mick...
[13:33] Templeton Tigerpaw: You can't have it both ways. Either our experinces are ENTIRELY represented in neuronal activity - or you must believe in the ghost in the machine, free will, and magic
[13:33] herman Bergson: In a previous lecture we have looked at a short mvie about the use of that lie detector....
[13:33] herman Bergson: Was really creepy...
[13:33] herman Bergson: The woman wanted to know if her husband had cheated on her more than once
[13:34] herman Bergson: the scanner said yes...
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: hmm ad seems not to be foolproof as i saw on mythbusters
[13:34] Templeton Tigerpaw: I'm really very much interested in your next lecture
[13:34] herman Bergson: the man in all sincerety said no...
[13:34] Bejiita Imako: Grant imahara fooled the machine
[13:34] Mick Nerido: We work harder in brain when we lie
[13:34] Templeton Tigerpaw: Yes, I agree, lie detectors do not work
[13:35] herman Bergson: there is a correlation between the mind and the brain activity....
[13:35] Bejiita Imako: ordinary polygraph test was very safe however cause the interogation and questions and the length of it makes imopssible to fool
[13:35] herman Bergson: the mind must be a property of the brain....
[13:35] Mick Nerido: That slight delay is an indication of a lie but not proof
[13:35] Bejiita Imako: myth busters tested first that and then the fMRI
[13:35] Templeton Tigerpaw: but that's not an argument against the principle of the thought. If you can decide on yes or no, it's only a matter of questioning skill to get the fullness of an experience - sine qualia
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: and concluded
[13:36] herman Bergson: But we are not able to see the link between neuronal activity and the statement I see a red spot
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: classic polygraph impossible to beat,
[13:36] Clint Pheocene: alcohol alone proves that the mind is a property of the physical brain
[13:36] herman Bergson: smiles
[13:36] herman Bergson: Yes Clint...sometimes a painful observation ^_^
[13:36] herman Bergson: especially the next morning :-)
[13:36] Bejiita Imako: hehehehe
[13:36] Sergeiana Yatsenko: alcohol loosens inhibitions...def..
[13:36] Clint Pheocene: lol
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: puking the first you do when waking up
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: eew thats NOT nice
[13:37] Bejiita Imako: hangover
[13:37] Templeton Tigerpaw: As I said, the redness and blueness can and must be accessed differently - but again, it's also a matter of yes or no
[13:38] herman Bergson: WEll I hope you get the picture...
[13:38] Bejiita Imako: I think so
[13:38] Bejiita Imako: ㋡
[13:38] herman Bergson: the asymetry between th eFirst Person and Thirdd person perspective...
[13:38] Templeton Tigerpaw: Essentially, the grounding of any experience in reality gives access to shared reality of experiences
[13:39] herman Bergson: Our next step will be an attempt to get rid of these First Person statements...
[13:39] herman Bergson: Well they are there, but scientifically not relevant
[13:39] Bejiita Imako: you can for ex never tell if someone says something to you do he really mean it unless some strong emo-thing proves that
[13:39] Templeton Tigerpaw: I understand your asymmetry, however, it's a very rock-bottom feature of the universe
[13:39] herman Bergson: They have to be translated into third person statemments ore something like that
[13:39] Bejiita Imako: cause you cant see what he is actually thinking
[13:40] herman Bergson: I we do not succeed we seem to be stuck with a kind of dualism after all
[13:40] herman Bergson: and that cannot be the case in a materialist theory of mind ^_^
[13:41] herman Bergson: So ..next lecture about ..what todo with mental states :-)
[13:41] Templeton Tigerpaw: If you look at a halloween mask from the inside and the outside - you can make it very very thin latex - so you are seeing the same on both sides - yet you are seeing different things - but every point of experience from the inside corresponds exactly to a point of experience on the outside
[13:42] herman Bergson: Which means, TEmpleton?
[[13:42] Templeton Tigerpaw: That's it's a matter of description
[13:42] herman Bergson: But that is only a THird Person Perspective
[13:43] herman Bergson: So a scientific issue....
[13:43] Templeton Tigerpaw: We do not have the full translation algorithm yet - because we are too afraid to face the truth about pleasure and power
[13:43] Mick Nerido: The inside is negative outside positive not the same but same
[13:44] herman Bergson: Well..thank you all for you participation....
[13:44] herman Bergson: Maybe you got a few things again to think about...
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: )
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: yes
[13:44] Widget Whiteberry: thank you so much. very interesting
[13:44] Mick Nerido: Thanks Herman!
[13:44] bergfrau Apfelbaum: byebye all:-)) see you Thursday! ty herman and class and all third persons. : -)
[13:44] Sybyle Perdide: thank you herman
[13:44] Clint Pheocene: great class...thanks
[13:44] bergfrau Apfelbaum: ***** APPPPPPPLLLLAAAUUUSSSSEEEEEEE***********
[13:44] Templeton Tigerpaw: You are welcome. I very much hope not to miss your next lectures
[13:44] Clerisse Beeswing: Thanks herman
[13:44] Chantal (nymf.hathaway): Thank you Herman!
[13:44] herman Bergson: next lecture we'll look at behaviorism as an attempt to deal with First Person statements
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: now im going to beat an fmri machine
[13:44] Bejiita Imako: lol
[13:45] Sergeiana Yatsenko: wish i could hav gotte here sooner
[13:45] Bejiita Imako: like mythbusters
[13:45] herman Bergson: Class dismissed ^_^
[13:45] Bejiita Imako: ㋡